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Abstract
We consider prior-free auctions for revenue and welfare maximization when agents have a
common budget. The abstract environments we consider are ones where there is a downward-
closed and symmetric feasibility constraint on the probabilities of service of the agents. These
environments include position auctions where slots with decreasing click-through rates are auc-
tioned to advertisers. We generalize and characterize the envy-free benchmark from Hartline and Yan
(2011) to settings with budgets and characterize the optimal envy-free outcomes for both welfare
and revenue. We give prior-free mechanisms that approximate these benchmarks. A building
block in our mechanism is a clinching auction for position auction environments. This auction
is a generalization of the multi-unit clinching auction of Dobzinski et al. (2008) and a special
case of the polyhedral clinching auction of Goel et al. (2012). For welfare maximization, we
show that this clinching auction is a good approximation to the envy-free optimal welfare for
position auction environments. For profit maximization, we generalize the random sampling
profit extraction auction from Fiat et al. (2002) for digital goods to give a 10.0-approximation
to the envy-free optimal revenue in symmetric, downward-closed environments. The profit max-
imization question is of interest even without budgets and our mechanism is a 7.5-approximation
which improving on the 30.4 bound of Ha and Hartline (2012).
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†Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. Email:
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1 Introduction
Economic mechanisms that are less dependent on the assumptions of the environment are more
likely to be relevant (Wilson, 1987). The area of prior-free mechanism design attempts to give
mechanisms that guarantee a good approximation to the designer’s objective without dependence
on distributional assumptions on the agents’ preferences. The main open questions in prior-free
mechanism design center around the departure from the ideal single-dimensional and linear model
of preferences, i.e., where an agent’s utility is given by her value for service less the payment she is
required to make. A paradigmatic example of a non-linear agent utility is one that is linear up to a
given budget that restricts the agent’s maximum possible payment. In this paper we consider the
designer’s objectives of revenue and welfare (separately) when agents have budgets, and we give
simple prior-free auctions that approximate a natural prior-free benchmark (for each objective).
Mechanism design studies optimization on inputs that are the private information of strategic
agents who may misreport their information if it benefits them. Agents will not misreport only
if they have no incentive to, i.e., if their utilities are maximized by truthful reporting. The key
challenge in designing mechanisms for strategic agents, then, is that incentive constraints bind
across possible agent misreports. A mechanism must therefore trade-off performance on one input
versus another. For general objectives, e.g., welfare with budgeted agents, profit, or makespan (for
unrelated machines), there is no single mechanism that is simultaneously optimal on all inputs.1
There are two approaches for addressing the non-pointwise-optimality of mechanisms. The Bayesian
approach, which is standard in economics, assumes that the agents’ preferences (inputs) are drawn
from a known distribution and the performance of the mechanism across different inputs can be
traded off so as to optimize its expected performance with respect to this given distribution. The
Bayesian optimal mechanism, therefore, depends on the distribution. The prior-free approach,
which is currently being developed in computer science, instead looks for a single mechanism that
approximates an economically motivated prior-free benchmark in worst-case over all inputs.
The first step in developing prior-free mechanisms is to identify an appropriate prior-free bench-
mark. Hartline and Yan (2011) recently observed that a simple and intuitive prior-free benchmark
can be defined based on a relaxation of the no-misreporting incentive constraint to a no-envy con-
straint. The advantage of the no-envy constraint is that it binds pointwise on each input instead of
across all inputs like incentive constraints; therefore, there is always a pointwise optimal envy-free
outcome. Furthermore, as Hartline and Yan (2011) pointed out, often this benchmark is an upper
bound on the optimal performance on the Bayesian optimal mechanism for any distribution; in
these cases approximating it pointwise gives a very strong performance guarantee. Our first con-
tribution is a generalization of the revenue-optimal envy-free benchmark without budgets to the
objectives of revenue and welfare with budgets.
A mechanism must optimize its objective subject to incentive constraints (discussed above), fea-
sibility constraints (i.e., constraints on how agents can be served together), and budget constraints.
It is most instructive to classify feasibility constraints in terms of the sophistication required of
constrained optimization of a weighted sum of the set of agents served (or, for randomized envi-
ronments, probabilities of service). An environment, like that of digital good auctions, may be
1For these objectives, the designer’s objective and the agents’ objectives are fundamentally at odds and the
incentive constraints of the agents do not permit the designer to obtain the same performance possible when the
inputs are public. These objectives contrast starkly to the objective of welfare maximization without budgets where
there is no conflict in the designer’s objective and the agents’ objectives and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism is pointwise optimal (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973).
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unconstrained. An ordinal environment, like those of position auctions (as popularized by advertis-
ing on Internet search engines), is one where the optimal algorithm is greedy on agents ordered by
weight. In a general cardinal environment, like those of single-minded combinatorial auctions, the
weights of the agents are necessary for optimization. An environment is symmetric if the feasibility
constraint respects all permutations of the agent identities. While feasibility constraints limit which
agents are served, budget constraints limit the prices that agents pay.
Recent results of Dobzinski et al. (2008) and Goel et al. (2012) have shown that a generalization
of the Ausubel (2004) clinching auction is the only Pareto optimal mechanism in ordinal environ-
ments. At a high-level, the clinching auction is given by an ascending price at which each agent
is allowed to claim any of the supply that would be left over if that agent were given the last
choice. Pareto optimality is the condition that there is no other feasible outcome where some par-
ticipant (including the designer) can be made strictly better off without making some participant
strictly worse off. Pareto optimality is a condition not an objective which means that it is not
clear what an approximation to Pareto optimality would be. It is also not true that all reasonable
auctions must satisfy Pareto optimality. The Bayesian welfare-optimal auction for budgeted agents
is not generally Pareto optimal (see Sections 3 and 4); and moreover, there does not generally exist
Pareto-optimal auctions for budgeted agents in cardinal environments (Goel et al., 2012).
Our first goal, given the limits of Pareto optimality, is to identify a prior-free auction that
approximates the envy-free optimal welfare when agents have budgets. The outcome of the clinching
auction (for ordinal environments) is envy free; however, it is not the welfare-optimal envy-free
outcome. Moreover, given distribution over agent values, the clinching auction is not the Bayesian
optimal auction for welfare either. We give a simple closed form expression for the clinching auction
in symmetric ordinal environments with a common budget and we show that it is a 2-approximation
to the envy-free benchmark.2
Our second goal is to identify a prior-free auction that approximates the envy-free optimal
revenue when agents have budgets. For revenue maximization without budgets Hartline and Yan
(2011) and Ha and Hartline (2012) recently gave general approaches for approximating the op-
timal envy-free revenue. The former extends a standard random sampling approach (for digital
good auctions) from Goldberg et al. (2001); the latter extends an approach based on “consensus
estimates” and “profit extraction” from Goldberg and Hartline (2003). Our approach is based on
an extension of the random sampling profit extraction auction from Fiat et al. (2002).3 Not only
is our mechanism the only one that is readily compatible with budget constraints, but also the
approximation factors we obtain, relative to the revenue-optimal envy-free benchmark, are the best
known. We show a 10.0-approximation to the envy-free optimal revenue in symmetric cardinal en-
vironments. Moreover, without budgets without budgets, our techniques give a 7.5-approximation
which imptoves on the 30.4 approximation of Ha and Hartline (2012).
Summary of Results Our main conceptual contribution is the adaptation of the prior-free
mechanism design framework initiated by the literature on digital goods (i.e., unconstrained envi-
2While both Dobzinski et al. (2008) and Goel et al. (2012) allow agents to have distinct budgets, the envy-free
benchmark is only economically well motivated in symmetric environments therefore a common budget is required.
Our restriction to symmetric environments and in particular a common budget is reasonable as designing prior-free
auctions for asymmetric environments is a challenge in itself even without budgets; for asymmetric environments only
a few positive results are known, see, e.g., Balcan et al. (2008) and Leonardi and Roughgarden (2012), both of which
are for unconstrained environments (e.g., digital goods).
3Therefore all of the leading approaches for digital good auctions extend to more general environments.
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ronments), e.g., Goldberg et al. (2001) to the structurally rich environments of Hartline and Yan
(2011) (including symmetric ordinal environment and cardinal environments)4 when agents’ prefer-
ences are non-linear as given by a common budget constraint. Our technical results are as follows:
• We give a characterization of the envy-free benchmark for welfare and revenue when agents
have a common budget. This characterization is via an extension of the characterization of
Bayesian optimal auctions for agents with budgets of Laffont and Robert (1996) to general
distributions.5
• We give a closed-form characterization of the clinching auction of Goel et al. (2012) in sym-
metric ordinal environments with a common budget.
• We prove that the clinching auction is a 2-approximation to the envy-free optimal welfare in
symmetric ordinal environments with a common budget.
• We extend the random sampling profit extraction auction from Fiat et al. (2002) to symmetric
cardinal environments with a common budget. This generalization gives a 10.0-approximation
to the envy-free benchmark. This is the first prior-free approximation of an economically well
motivated benchmark for agents with budgets and it also improves (to 7.5 from 30.4) on the
best known prior-free approximation without budgets.
• The clinching auction is not well defined in cardinal environments; the above auction converts
the symmetric cardinal environment to symmetric ordinal environment where the clinching
auction can be run and its objective is close to optimal (for the original cardinal environment).
Related Work The theory of Bayesian optimal auctions for welfare or revenue when agents have
budgets (a form of non-linear utility) is more complex than that of revenue when agents have linear
utility. In the latter, e.g., the revenue-optimal mechanism is given by optimizing virtual values
which are given by a simple distribution-dependent function of agents’ values (Myerson, 1981). In
the former, under some restrictive distributional assumptions, a similar Lagrangian virtual value
approach gives the optimal mechanism (subject to careful choice of the Lagrangian variable, see
Laffont and Robert, 1996).
Hartline and Yan (2011) defined the envy-free benchmark as a relaxation of the Bayesian opti-
mal auction that can be optimized pointwise. Our characterization of the envy-free benchmark for
welfare and revenue for agents with budgets combines and extends the results of Laffont and Robert
(1996) and Hartline and Yan (2011).
There are three main techniques for designing revenue maximizing prior-free auctions for digital
goods (i.e., where there is no feasibility constraint). The random sampling optimal price auction
was defined by Goldberg et al. (2001). The consensus estimate profit extraction auction was defined
by Goldberg and Hartline (2003). The random sampling profit extraction auction was defined by
Fiat et al. (2002). The first two approaches were generalized to symmetric cardinal environments
by Hartline and Yan (2011) and Ha and Hartline (2012), respectively. We generalize the third
4Hartline and Yan (2011) refer to symmetric ordinal environments equivalently as position environments and
matroid permutation environments and to symmetric cardinal environments as downward-closed permutation envi-
ronments.
5The Laffont and Robert (1996) characterization holds for monotone hazard rate distributions with increasing
density; under such assumptions, many of the novel properties of optimal auctions with budgets do not arise.
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approach to these environments. Our generalization gives the best known approximation factor (to
the envy-free benchmark) without budgets (of 7.5) and the first approximation with budgets (of
10.0).
Our mechanisms are based on the clinching auction of Ausubel (2004) generalized to multi-unit
environments (a special case of ordinal environments) with budgets by Dobzinski et al. (2008) and
ordinal environments by Goel et al. (2012). There are two dimensions on which we can compare our
results to these prior studies of the clinching auction, (a) whether agents have a common budget or
distinct budgets and (b) the feasibility constraint of the designer. With respect to (a), our results
are weaker as we require a common budget, with respect to (b) our symmetric ordinal environment
is between multi-unit environments and the general ordinal environments where the latter allows for
asymmetry. The advantage of our restriction to environments that are symmetric in budget (a) and
feasibility (b), is that we are able to derive a closed-form formula for the outcome of the clinching
auction. Finally, Goel et al. (2012) show that the clinching auction does not generally extend
to arbitrary cardinal environments; however, we show that any symmetric cardinal environment
contain a symmetric ordinal environment for which the clinching auction performs well (with respect
to the objective on the original cardinal environment). Moreover, we can effectively find this ordinal
environment and run the clinching auction on it without compromising the agent incentives.
Organization We give formal definitions of the model in Section 2. In Section 3 we characterize
the envy-free benchmarks for agents with budgets. In Section 4 we characterize the clinching auction
in position environments and show that it is a 2-approximation to the envy-free optimal welfare.
In Section 5 we define the biased sampling profit extraction auction and prove that it is a 10.0-
approximation to the envy-free optimal revenue when the agents have a common budget. When
the agents do not have a budget constraint, the auction can be improved to a 7.5-approximation
and this improvement is given in Appendix B.
2 Preliminaries
Incentives We study auction problems for n single-dimensional agents with a common budget.
Each agent i has a value vi for the service. A mechanism maps reported values v = (v1, . . . , vn) to a
probability that agent i wins, xi(v), and a payment pi(v).
6 The agents are financially constrained
by a budget B but otherwise are risk neutral. Agent i’s utility from the mechanism on reports v
is vixi(v)− pi(v) if pi(v) ≤ B and negative infinity otherwise.
A mechanism is budget respecting (BR) if no agent pays more than the budget on any valuation
profile, i.e., for all i and v, pi(v) ≤ B. A mechanism is individually rational (IR) if a risk-neutral
agent weakly prefers to participate in the mechanism than not. ∀i,v, vixi(v) − pi(v) ≥ 0. We
say that a mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if a risk-neutral agent maximizes her utility by
bidding her true value. I.e., ∀i,v, z, vixi(v) − pi(v) ≥ vixi(z,v−i) − pi(z,v−i). Myerson (1981)
characterized incentive compatible mechanisms for single dimensional agents (without budgets) as
follows.
Theorem 2.1 (Myerson, 1981). A mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if the allocation is
monotone non-decreasing in the reported values, i.e., for all i, xi(z,v−i) is monotone non-decreasing
6For clarity we will equate randomized mechanisms with deterministic mechanisms outputting fractional assign-
ments and deterministic payments (both equal to their expectations).
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in z and the expected payments satisfy pi(z,v−i) = vixi(z,v−i)−
∫ vi
0 xi(z,v−i)dz.
Feasibility As described above, an auction produces a randomized outcome for each agent with
probabilities denoted by x = (x1, . . . , xn). We assume there is a feasibility constraint that governs
the set of such allocations that can be produced. We denote the space of feasible allocations by
X ⊂ [0, 1]n. Our only requirement on this space is that it is symmetric, convex, and downward-
closed.7 Moreover, all we need from our feasibility constraint is that there is an algorithm that
(approximately) optimizes a linear sum of weights of the agents served subject to it (and that any
agent served can be instead rejected); in these cases we instead view X as the induced allocation
of the algorithm.
Given this algorithmic view, we partition the classes of feasibility constraints by the kinds of
algorithms that work. If “greedy by weight” is optimal then we refer to the feasibility constraint
as ordinal as only the order of the weights matters and not the actual cardinal weights. We
refer to the more general case as cardinal. Importantly the ordinal, symmetric case is identical
to the position auction environment under common study. A position environment is given by
a decreasing sequence of position weights w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wn and each agent can be matched to at
most one position. The cardinal, symmetric case includes problems considered in the literature
such as the (symmetric restriction) of the polyhedral environments of Goel et al. (2012) and the
downward-closed permutation environments of Hartline and Yan (2011).
Envy-free Benchmarks The goal of prior-free mechanism design is to give a mechanism with
and a performance guarantee that holds point-wise, i.e., in worst case, on valuation profiles. Such a
prior-free guarantee requires comparison to a prior-free benchmark which is also defined point-wise
on valuation profiles. Prior-free benchmarks that do not take into account the incentive constraints
of the mechanism design problem are often inapproximable, but considering incentive constraints
is non-trivial because incentive constraints bind on possible agent misreports and not point-wise
on the valuation profile.
Hartline and Yan (2011) recently demonstrated that envy-freedom constrants are a reasonable
point-wise relaxation of incentive constraints. Formally, an outcome (x,p) is envy free for valuation
profile v if for all i and j, agent i does not prefer to swap allocation and payment with agent j,
i.e., vixi − pi ≥ vixj − pj. The envy-free benchmark (with budgets) is defined by optimizing over
all envy-free outcomes (that are budget respecting). The following lemma characterizes envy-free
outcomes for valuation profiles v that are, without loss of generality, indexed by value, i.e., vi’s are
monotonically non-decreasing in i.
Lemma 2.1 (Hartline and Yan, 2011). Allocation x has prices for which it is envy free if and only
if it is swap monotone, i.e., xi ≥ xi+1. The minimum and maximum payments for which such an
x is envy-free are are pmini =
∑n
j=i+1(xj−1 − xj)vj and pmaxi =
∑n
j=i(xj − xj+1)vj , respectively.
Notice that envy-free payments are monotone non-decreasing in agent values so an envy-free
outcome is budget feasible if and only if the highest valued agent (i.e., agent 1) has payment p1 ≤ B.
The envy-free optimal benchmark for welfare and revenue with budgets is defined by optimizing
over all envy-free outcomes with respect to the respective objective. (These benchmarks are further
7Our envy-free benchmark only makes sense in symmetric environments, mechanism design spaces are al-
ways convex if randomization is allowed, and downward closure says that if x ∈ X then x−i ∈ X where
x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, 0, xi+1, . . . , xn).
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characterized in Section 3.)
EFOW(v, B) = max
{∑
i
vixi : (x,p) is EF, IR and BR
}
EFOR(v, B) = max
{∑
i
pi : (x,p) is EF, IR and BR
}
A prior-free guarantee about a mechanism’s performance is defined as follows. A mechanism M
is a β-approximation to an envy-free benchmark if its expected performance M(v, B) is at least
β EFO(v, B) for all v and B. For technical reasons, we slightly modify the envy-free benchmark for
revenue and instead approximate EFOR(v(2), B) where v(2) = (v2, v2, v3, . . . , vn). This is necessary
because, e.g., when v1 ≫ nv2, it is impossible to approximate EFOR(v1, B). When the context is
clear, we will remove the superscripts and the budget and write EFO(v) for readability.
3 The Envy-free Benchmark
In this section we characterize welfare-optimal envy-free outcomes for agents with a common budget
in symmetric, cardinal environments; at the end of the section we adapt the characterization to the
objective of revenue.
Recall that in such an environment an allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) is envy-free if and only if it is
swap-monotone and its minimum payments are given by the formula pmini =
∑n
j=i+1 vj(xj−1 − xj)
for all agents i (Lemma 2.1). Note that in order to maximize welfare subject to a budget constraint,
picking the minimum envy-free payments is clearly optimal. Further, as envy-free payments are
monotone, it is sufficient to impose the budget constraint only on the payment of the top agent,
i.e., p1. Therefore, the welfare-optimal envy-free allocation can be captured by the following linear
program (LP).8
max
∑n
i=1
vixi (1)
s.t. xi ≥ xi+1 ∀ i
p1 =
∑n
i=2
vi(xi−1 − xi) ≤ B.
x is feasible.
The relaxation of this LP obtained by Lagrangifying the budget constraint is as follows.
max
∑n
i=1
vixi − λ
(∑n
i=2
vi(xi−1 − xi)
)
+ λB (2)
s.t. xi ≥ xi+1 ∀ i
x is feasible.
Lemma 3.1. An allocation is optimal for LP (1) if and only if, either
• for some choice of λ > 0, the allocation is optimal for the Lagrangian relaxation (2) with λ,
and it satisfies the budget constraint with equality,
∑n
i=2 vi(xi−1 − xi) = B, or
8Notice that the Lemma 2.1 allows us replace the IC and IR constraint with a monotonicity constraint on x and
it allows payment constraints to be expressed in terms of values.
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• the allocation is optimal for the Lagrangian relaxation (2) with λ = 0 and satisfies the budget
constraint,
∑n
i=2 vi(xi−1 − xi) ≤ B.
Proof. The statement of the theorem is equivalent to complementary slackness conditions charac-
terizing optimal solutions of an LP.
We now consider the optimization problem given by the Lagrangian relaxation (2) for a fixed
choice of λ. The objective function of the Lagrangian relaxation (2) can be rewritten as
∑
i φ
λ
i xi
where φλ1 = v1 − λv2 and φλi = vi + λ(vi − vi+1) for i ≥ 2. We refer to these as Lagrangian
virtual values. The Lagrangian relaxation is now simply the problem of finding the Lagrangian
virtual surplus optimal allocation, subject to feasibility, swap-monotonicity, and, when p1 = B
when λ > 0.
Optimizing the Lagrangian virtual surplus
∑
i φ
λ
i xi of non-monotone virtual values subject to
swap monotonicity (of the allocation) can be simplified via the technique of ironing (cf. Myerson,
1981). The resulting ironed virtual values are monotone and, therefore, ironed virtual surplus max-
imization without a swap-monotonicity constraint on the allocation will always give an allocation
that is swap monotone.
Ironed Lagrangian virtual values are constructed as follows. The Lagrangian revenue curve is the
cumulative Lagrangian virtual value Rλ(j) =
∑j
i=1 φ
λ
i =
∑j
i=1 vi − λvj+1. The ironed Lagrangian
revenue curve R¯λ is the smallest concave function that is point-wise larger than Rλ and the origin.
The ironed Lagrangian virtual value of i is the left slope of the ironed Lagrangian revenue curve,
i.e., φ¯i = R¯
λ(i) − R¯λ(i − 1). An ironed interval I = {i, . . . , j} is a sequence of consecutive agents
where R¯λ(i − 1) = Rλ(i − 1), R¯λ(j) = Rλ(j), and R¯λ(k) > Rλ(k) for k ∈ {i, . . . , j − 1}. The
left-slope of the ironed Lagrangian revenue curve for all j ∈ I is the same; therefore, their ironed
Lagrangian virtual values are the same.
Lemma 3.2. An allocation x is optimal for the Lagrangian relaxation (2) if and only if the allo-
cation maximizes the ironed Lagrangian virtual surplus and the allocation is constant over agents
in the same ironed interval.
Lemma 3.2 has the same proof as the corresponding lemma of Hartline and Yan (2011) for
(non-Lagrangian) ironed virtual surplus maximization.
We now describe a tie-breaking procedure for Lagrangian ironed virtual surplus maximization
that (a) serves agents in the same ironed interval with the same probability (as per Lemma 3.2) and
(b) meets the budget constraint with equality (as per Lemma 3.1). Notice ties may arise because
agents within the same ironed interval have same ironed virtual value, because agents in consecutive
ironed intervals may have the same ironed virtual value, and because several sets of agents may
have the same cumulative ironed virtual value. The first kind of tie must be broken uniformly
at random, the latter two kinds of ties must be broken so as to meet the budget constraint with
equality.
The tie-breaking rule we will give is based on agents’ values. Notice that the objective of (2)
is the difference between the social surplus and λp1 (the payment of the top agent scaled by λ).
Therefore, when there are ties in Lagrangian virtual surplus, it must be that the tied allocation with
the maximum (resp. minimum) surplus minimizes (resp. maximizes) the payment of the top agent.
This maximum payment must be over budget and the minimum payment must be under budget.
Therefore, the appropriate convex combination of these two allocations has payment exactly equal
to the budget. The outcome produced is welfare optimal for budgeted agents.
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The following approach optimizes Lagrangian ironed virtual surplus with tie-breaking to max-
imize or minimize the welfare subject to (a) swap monotonicity and (b) agents within the same
ironed interval receiving the same probability of service. To maximize welfare, average the values
of agents within each ironed interval and tie-break to maximize this averaged welfare. This en-
sures that the agents in the same ironed interval are treated the same, but otherwise allows the
mechanism to optimize welfare over sets of agents with tied Lagrangian ironed virtual surplus. To
minimize welfare we would like to optimize the negative of the welfare over allocations with equal
Lagrangian ironed virtual surplus. However, this could result in failure of swap monotonicity as
agents in successive ironed intervals with the same Lagrangian ironed virtual value will be ranked in
the opposite order as required for swap monotonicity. Therefore, to minimize welfare, average the
values of agents with equal Lagrangian ironed virtual value (this includes the averaging of agents
within the same ironed interval, but additionally averages agents in successive ironed intervals that
have the same Lagrangian ironed virtual value), and tie-break to minimize this averaged welfare.
For symmetric, ordinal environments we can be more precise about the tie-breaking process
above. In particular, without budgets, the welfare-optimal allocation is given by the greedy-by-
value algorithm. Any other swap monotone allocation can be thought of as starting with the greedy
outcome and then shifting some of the allocation from higher valued agents to lower valued agents
(by partially randomizing their order). Of course, any such reallocation lowers the welfare. The
allocation that maximizes Lagrangian ironed virtual surplus and welfare (subject to Lemma 3.2)
is the one that randomizes the order of agents in each ironed interval and then applies the greedy
algorithm to this ordering. The allocation that maximizes Lagrangian ironed virtual surplus and
minimizes welfare is the one that randomizes the order of all sets of agents with equal Lagrangian
ironed virtual value. As above, the appropriate convex combination of these two allocations meets
the budget constraint with equality.
Notice that above we are taking the convex combination of a minimal ironing and maximal
ironing. A set of consecutive ironed intervals with the same Lagrangian ironed virtual value by
this construction will be partially ironed. This partial ironing is absent in existing characteriza-
tions of optimal mechanisms. Partial ironing is never necessary for revenue maximization without
budgets (for which the ironing technique was first developed) and prior work on welfare or revenue
maximization with budgets has restricted attention to benevolent distributions where there is only
a single ironed interval (if any) that includes the highest-valued agent (and therefore there is no
partial ironing).
We summarize the discussion above with the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. For symmetric, ordinal environments the optimal envy-free allocation is given by
Lagrangian ironed virtual surplus maximization (for an appropriate Lagrangian variable) where
agents within an ironed interval are completely ironed and agents with equal Lagrangian ironed
virtual values are partially ironed (for an appropriate probability).
The characterization of the revenue-optimal envy-free outcome for agents with a common budget
is the same as above except for (a) the specific formula for Lagrangian virtual values and (b) the
tie-breaking procedure. The tie-breaking procedure is a bit more complex than for the welfare
objective.
Virtual values are derived starting from the maximum envy-free payments pmaxi =
∑n
j=i vj(xj−
xj+1) from Lemma 2.1. The objective revenue (without budgets) is given by maximization of
the virtual surplus for (non-Lagrangian) virtual values ivi − (i − 1)vi−1 (Hartline and Yan, 2011).
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Relaxing the budget constraint gives Lagrangian virtual values φλ1 = v1(1−λ) and φλi = (i−λ)vi−
(i− 1− λ)vi−1 for i ≥ 2. The Lagrangian revenue curve is Rλ(i) = (i− λ)vi with Rλ(0) = 0.
For tie breaking, notice that the analogous objective of the Lagrangian relaxation (2) is revenue
minus λp1. Therefore, among allocations with the same Lagrangian ironed virtual surplus, the
one with the highest revenue has the highest payment of the top agent and the one with the
lowest revenue has the lowest payment of the top agent. Revenue is, of course, equal to the (non-
Lagrangian) virtual surplus. Whereas for maximizing and minimizing welfare the monotonicity of
values implies that we should either prefer to iron as little or as much as possible, for maximizing
revenue, the virtual values may not be monotone. Therefore, ironing (i.e., averaging) can be
good and bad for both maximizing and minimizing revenue. The following process averages the
(non-Lagrangian) virtual values correctly. Consider a set of consecutive Lagrangian ironed intervals
with the same Lagrangian ironed virtual value. Average the (non-Lagrangian) virtual values within
each interval, calculate the induced revenue curve (by summing prefixes of these averaged virtual
values), consider the two-dimensional convex hull the point set that defined this revenue curve. For
maximum revenue, iron as for the upper convex hull; for minimum revenue, iron as for the lower
convex hull. Optimizing Lagrangian ironed virtual surplus with tie-breaking by averaged virtual
surplus (from the averaged virtual values calculated above) gives the outcomes with the minimum
and maximum payment of the top agent. Mixing between these appropriately to meet the budget
constraint with equality gives the revenue-optimal envy-free outcome.
4 Welfare approximation for agents with a common budget
In this section we study the (polyhedral) clinching auction of Goel et al. (2012) in position environ-
ments with a common budget. The outcome of the clinching auction is fundamentally simpler in
structure than those of the optimal incentive-compatible auction and optimal envy-free outcome.
A fundamental construct in incentive-compatible and envy-free optimization is ironing, that is,
randomizing between agents whose values fall within a given interval. In Section 3 we charac-
terized welfare-optimal envy-free outcomes as having multiple disjoint ironed intervals. Our first
task of this section is to give a similar discription of the outcome of the clinching auction. In
these terms, the clinching auction has (essentially) one ironed interval and it always contains the
top agent. This ironed interval is partially ironed with the singleton interval containing the next
highest-valued agent. We give a simple closed-form expression for calculating exactly how this
partial ironing is performed.
The clinching auction is not welfare-optimal in two respects. First, given a Bayesian prior
distribution, the clinching auction’s expected welfare is not generally optimal among all incentive
compatible mechanisms. Second, though the outcome of the clinching auction is envy free, it is
not the welfare-optimal envy-free outcome. Nonetheless, we show that the clinching welfare is a
two-approximation to the envy-free optimal welfare.
4.1 The clinching auction for position environments
Goel et al. (2012) generalize the clinching auction for budgeted agents to ordinal environments. In
this section, we characterize the outcome of this process for symmetric ordinal environments, a.k.a.,
position environments. At a high level, the clinching auction is described by an ascending price-
clock with agents clinching some of the supply at the price as it increases. By the symmetry of the
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environment and the fact that values of agents above an offered price do not affect the allocation,
the budget and partial allocations are identical for each agent that remains in the auction as the
price increases. The clinching auction can thus be formulated as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Clinching Auction). The clinching auction maintains an allocation and price-
clock that start from zero. The price-clock ascends continuously and the allocation and budget are
adjusted as follows.
1. Agents whose values are less than the price-clock are removed and their allocation is frozen.
2. The demand of any remaining agent is the remaining budget divided by the price clock.
3. Each remaining agent clinches (and adds to their current allocation) an amount that corre-
sponds to the largest fraction of their demand that can be satisfied when all other remaining
agents are first given as much of their demand as possible (subject to the feasibility con-
straint).9
4. The budget and allocation are updated to reflect the amount clinched in the previous step.
The auction ends when everyone is removed or the remaining budget is zero.
The reason that the clinching auction is relatively simple to describe in position environments
with a common budget is that the feasibility constraint imposed by clinching auctions is one where
allocation probability of top positions can be shifted to bottom positions (e.g., by randomizing),
but not vice versa. Therefore, an allocation x (in decreasing order) is feasible for position weights
(w1, . . . , wn) (in decreasing order) if the cumulative allocation Xi =
∑
j≤i xj at each coordinate i
is at most the cumulative position weight Wi =
∑
j≤iwj .
Proposition 4.1. The clinching auction is incentive compatible and Pareto optimal in position
environments with a common budget.
Pareto optimality means that there is no other reallocation of goods and money that makes an
agent strictly better off and no agents are worse off. Proposition 4.1, which is a special case of a
more general result of Goel et al. (2012) implies implies the following structure on the outcome.
This structural theorem generalizes one from Dobzinski et al. (2008) (for single-item auctions). It
shows that, essentially, the clinching auction is ironing only the top agents.
Theorem 4.1. Order the agents and positions in decreasing order and let κ be the highest-valued
agent who pays strictly less than the budget. Then,
(a) the auction terminates the moment the price-clock exceeds vκ,
(b) agents with higher values than κ each receive the same service probability (and pay the budget),
(c) agent κ receives at least the service probability of her corresponding position,
(d) agents with lower values than κ each receive exactly the service probability of their corresponding
positions, and
9This step is vague in general environments; however, in ordinal environments, i.e., where the greedy algorithm is
optimal, it is precise.
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(e) the outcome is envy free.
Proof. An agent drops out of the clinching auction when her value is exceeded; otherwise, the
auction terminates with the price clock below her value when the remaining budget is zero. Let κ
be the last agent to drop out when her value is exceeded. By the definition of the clinching auction
and symmetry, all higher-valued agents pay the budget and receive the same probability of service.
Again by the symmetry of the process there is no envy.
Now consider the agents κ, . . . , n who are paying strictly less than the budget. Assume that
initially all excess service probability from the top κ−1 is given to agent κ. Feasibility implies that
service probability cannot be shifted up from low-valued agents to high-valued agents and Pareto
optimality implies that service probability cannot be shifted down. Consider any probability shifted
down from a higher valued agent to a lower valued agent, as these agents are not paying their budget,
a Pareto improvement would be for the higher valued agent to buy this shifted service probability
from the lower valued agent (at a per-unit price equal to her value). Consequently, agents κ+1, . . . , n
get their corresponding position weight and agent κ gets at least her corresponding position weight.
Finally, we show that the price clock stops immediately after it exceeds vκ. Assume that the
allocation probability of κ is strictly higher than her corresponding position weight (the case of
equality is addressed by Theorem 4.2) and suppose that the price clock continues to rise. The
actual values of the agents who have not retired are never taken into account in the behavior of
the clinching auction. Therefore we can lower vκ−1 to just below price clock and at which point
agent κ−1 would retire (and not pay her full budget). However, now we have both κ and κ−1 not
paying their full budget and κ is getting strictly more service probability than her corresponding
weight which contridicts the other results of this theorem.
Bκ
B
Bκ−1
w¯κ−1
w¯κ
xκ
wκ
...
wn−1
wn
vn vn−1· · ·vκ+1 vκ vκ−1 · · · v1
b
b
b
b
b
b b
Figure 1: The outcome of the clinching auction is completely specified by this figure. For agents
i < κ, the allocation rule xi(z,v−i) of the clinching auction is depicted; the payment of these
agents is equal to the area of shadded region which is equal to the budget B. Agents i ≥ κ share
this allocation rule on z ≤ vi which is the relevant portion of the allocation rule for calculating
payments. In the envy-free outcome that irones the top i agents (and ignores the budget constraint)
the payment of the top agent, denoted Bi, is depicted for i ∈ {κ−1, κ}. It is clear from the picture
these are monotone in i and Bκ < B ≤ Bκ−1.
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It is easy to see from Theorem 4.1 that the service probability of each of the top κ− 1 agents is
a little less than the average weight of the top κ− 1 positions, and a little more than the average
weight of the top κ positions. The service probability of κ is between the weight of her corresponding
position and the average weight of the top κ positions. In fact, the exact service probabilities (and
correspinding payments) can be precisely calculated.
The execution of the clinching auction can be described by two phases. In the first phase,
the position weights and values are binding; in the second phase, the budget is binding but the
position weights are not. Consider ironing the top i agents and the associated minimum envy-free
payments. Agents j ≤ i are served with probability w¯i = (w1 + . . .+wi)/i and their payments are
Bi = vi+1(w¯i−wi)+
∑n
j=i+1 vj(wj−1−wj). The payment Bi is decreasing in i (which is obvious as in
Figure 1) and is zero for i = n and (if the budget is binding) greater than the budget for i = 1. Let
κ be such that Bκ ≥ B > Bκ+1. In the first phase each of the bottom n−κ agents will clinch their
corresponding positions. Let B′ be the remaining budget and let w′i = wi−wκ−1 be the remaining
weight of position i ≤ κ that has not been clinched (with average weight w¯′κ = w¯κ − wκ−1). In
the next phase, the clinching auction will behave exactly like the clinching auction for multi-unit
envionments: the budget starts to bind at a price clock at most vκ and then the instant the price-
clock exceeds vκ the remaining supply is evenly clinched by the highest κ − 1 agents. Figure 1
depicts the resulting outcome and Theorem 4.2 formalizes the observed structure.
Theorem 4.2. For any position environment given by position weights (w1, . . . , wn) and budget B
satisfying Bκ < B ≤ Bκ−1 for some κ, the polyhydral clinching auction would allocate with:
(a) wi to every i ≥ κ+ 1, and
(b) κw¯κ split among the top κ agents evenly except for agent κ obtaining δ less,
where δ is a simple function of vκ+1; vκ; the remaining budget, denoted B
′; and the unclinched
supply, denoted W ′κ, after agent κ+ 1 drops out.
4.2 Welfare approximation for ordinal environments
We now show that the clinching auction which (essentially) irons only the top positions, is a two-
approximation to the envy-free optimal welfare which may come from ironing an arbitrary number
of consecutive positions; moreover, this bound is tight.
Theorem 4.3. For any position environment with common budgets, the welfare obtained by the
clinching auction is a 2-approximation to the envy-free optimal welfare. Furthermore, this ratio is
tight even for the single-item environment.
Proof. Let κ be the highest-valued agent who does not pay the budget in the clinching auction.
Recall from Theorem 4.1 that, relative to the outcome of the clinching auction, if we iron the top κ
agents (to get average service probability w¯κ =
∑
i≤κwi/κ) then agent κ gets slightly more service
probability at the expense of lowering the service probability of the top κ− 1 agents; overall there
is a net decrease in welfare.
Clinching(v) ≥
κ∑
i=1
viw¯κ +
n∑
i=κ+1
viwi (3)
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w¯κ−1
vκ vκ−1 · · · v1
b
b
b
b
b
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(a) The upper bound (4) is depicted pictorially. In
the clinching auction, the payment of the highest
valued agent (cross-hatched) is equal to the budget
and at least the rectangle (striped) whose area is
vκw¯κ−1.
x1
xj
vκ vκ−1 · · · v1
b
b
b
b
(b) The lower bound (5) is depicted pictorially. The
payment of the highest valued agent (striped) is
equal to the budget and at least the rectangle (cross-
hatched) whose area is vκ(x1 − xκ).
Figure 2: Proofs by picture of the upper and lower bounds on the budget B.
Let x be the optimal envy-free allocation. We know two things about x. First, it is feasible, which
means, in particular, that
∑
i≤κ xi ≤ κw¯κ, i.e., the cumulative allocaiton is at most the cumulative
supply. Second, the payment of the highest-valued agent, i.e., p1, (which is given by the “area above
the allocation rule” as specified by the mininimum envy-free payment identity of Lemma 2.1) is at
most the budget. We use these two bounds to show that x1 ≤ 2w¯κ.
The clinching auction ends when the price-clock just exceeds vκ, consequently the per-unit
cost of service is bounded by vκ. The probability of service clinched by the top κ − 1 agents is
slightly lower than w¯κ−1 = 1κ−1
∑
i<κwi. Therefore an upper bound on the maximum payment
(and therefore the budget) is:
vκw¯κ−1 ≥ B. (4)
In the envy-free optimal outcome the payment of the top agent (and therefore the budget) is at
least:
B =
n∑
i=2
(xi−1 − xi)vi ≥ vκ(x1 − xκ). (5)
The bounds (4) and (5) combine to give a bound on the probability of service x1 of the top agent
(and thus any agent) in the envy-free outcome.
x1 ≤ xκ + w¯κ−1. (6)
The feasibility constraint of the position environment restricts the envy-free outcome so that
κw¯κ ≥
∑
i≤κ xi ≥ x1 + (κ− 1)xκ.
Solving for x1 we get a second upper bound.
x1 ≤ κw¯κ − (κ− 1)xκ. (7)
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Add (κ− 1) times (6) to (7) to get:
κx1 ≤ κw¯κ + (κ− 1)w¯κ−1. (8)
We conclude that x1 ≤ 2w¯κ as desired.
For the optimal envy-free welfare problem, if the budget constraint is replaced by the weaker
constraint of xi ≤ 2w¯κ, the welfare can only get better. Furthermore, the optimal allocation for
this relaxed problem would shift as little service probability down from top slots to lower slots as
possible so as to meet the allocation constraint that xi ≤ 2w¯κ. As the average weight of the top κ
positions is w¯κ the probability of service for agent κ (which is the least of the top agents) can only
be at most the average. Therefore, no additional weight is shifted down to lower agents j > κ so,
EFO(v) ≤
κ∑
i=1
2viw¯κ +
n∑
i=κ+1
viwi ≤ 2Clinching(v),
where the last inequality follows from (3).
To show that the 2-approximation is tight, consider the following single-item scenario with a
common budget of B = 1. There are N + 1 agents; the highest valuation is N3, the middle N − 1
valuations are N , and the last valuation is N − ǫ where ǫ is a small positive number.
The welfare-optimal envy-free allocation would serve the bottom N agents with equal proba-
bility xL and the top agent with probability xH > xL. By optimizing the welfare N
3xH + N
2xL
with the budget constraint N(xH − xL) ≤ 1, and the supply constraint xH + NxL ≤ 1, we have
xH =
2
N+1 while xL =
N−1
N(N+1) . Thus the optimal envy-free welfare for this case is 2N
2 −N .
The clinching auction would not let anybody clinch as long as the price clock is below N since
there are N + 1 agents who demand at least 1
N
while we only have 1 item. However, as soon as
the price-clock reaches N , the bottom agent drops out, and we have N agents left who demand
1
N
each. Thus, each of the top N agents would receive exactly 1
N
and pay the budget. Thus the
welfare for clinching in this case is N2 +N − 1.
In the limit as N approaches ∞, the ratio between the two welfares approaches 2.
5 Revenue approximation for agents with a common budget
The main approaches to prior-free auctions for digital goods generalize to symmetric cardinal en-
vironments (without budgets). Hartline and Yan (2011) generalized the random sampling auction,
and Ha and Hartline (2012) generalized the consensus estimate profit extraction auction. In this
section, we generalize the random sampling profit extraction auction of Fiat et al. (2002) for digital
good environments to symmetric cardinal environments with a common budget. The random sam-
pling profit extraction auction splits the agents into a market and a sample, estimates the optimal
profit from the sample, and then attempts to extract that profit from the market.
A profit extractor is a mechanism that is given some extra information and, if that informa-
tion is correct, is able to extract a corresponding profit. For symmetric cardinal environments,
Ha and Hartline (2012) gave a profit extractor that is parameterized by an estimated valuation
profile and is able to extract profit of at least the envy-free optimal revenue for the estimated val-
uation profile when that estimate is a coordinate-wise lower bound on the true valuation profile.10
10The Ha and Hartline (2012) profit extractor is described in Definition B.1 of Appendix B.
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Our profit extractor below is a simplification of that of Ha and Hartline (2012) generalized to the
case where agents have budgets.
Definition 5.1. The clinching profit extractor, PEv˜, is parameterized by non-increasing valuation
profile v˜. It calculates the optimal envy-free outcome x˜ for v˜ and then runs the clinching auction
for position weights x˜ on the true valuation profile v.
Assume that v and v˜ are in non-increasing order. Define v as one-ahead after index η for v˜
if η is the lowest index for which all i > η satisfy vi+1 ≥ v˜i. When η = 0 define v as one-ahead
dominating v˜, denoted v−1 ≥ v˜. The following lemma shows that the clinching profit extractor on
v is able to obtain the contribution to the optimal envy-free revenue for v˜ from agents {η+1, . . . , n}.
Lemma 5.1. If v one-ahead dominates v˜ then the clinching profit extractor revenue is at least
the estimated envy-free optimal revenue, i.e., PEv˜(v) ≥ EFO(v˜); moreover, if v is one-ahead after
index η for v˜ then the contribution to the profit extractor revenue from agent i > η is at least the
contribution to the estimated envy-free optimal revenue from i, i.e., PEv˜i (v) ≥ EFOi(v˜).
Proof. We will prove the second part of the lemma which implies the first. Consider an i > η. The
maximum i could pay in any outcome is the budget, so if i pays her budget in the clinching auction
then the bound holds. Suppose instead that i pays strictly less than her budget in the clinching
auction. Consider the following sequence of inequalities with explanation below (where x is the
allocation of the clinching auction and x˜ is the envy-free optimal outcome for v˜).
PEv˜i (v) ≥
n∑
j=i+1
(xj−1 − xj)vj
≥
n∑
j=i+1
(x˜j−1 − x˜j)vj
≥
n∑
j=i+1
(x˜j−1 − x˜j)v˜j−1
= EFOi(v˜).
The first inequality follows from envy freedom of the clinching auction and the formula for minimum
envy-free payments (Lemma 2.1). For j > i, Theorem 4.1 implies that xj = x˜j because all but the
highest-valued agent who does not pay her budget are allocated with exactly their corresponding
position weight; the theorem also implies that xi ≥ x˜i as agent i also does not pay her budget (but
she might be the highest such agent). The second equality then follows as the service probabilities
are unaffected by the swap from xj to x˜j except for xi which only appears positively and is at
least x˜i. The third inequality comes from the fact that i is greater than η so one-ahead dominance
holds at i and higher indices. The final equality follows from the formula for maximum envy-free
payments (Lemma 2.1).
We now define a simple biased sampling procedure and show that it ensures one ahead domi-
nance with significant probability.
Definition 5.2 (Biased Sampling). Parameterized by a probability p, the biased sampling process
assigns each agent into the sample S independently with probability p, otherwise the market M .
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Let vM and vS be the sorted valuation vectors of M and S respectively, and assume that vM
and vS are padded with 0’s to be equal in length for comparison convenience. The biased sampling
process has the following probabilistic properties (proof given at the end of the section).
Lemma 5.2. For the biased sampling process with p < 0.5 and η being a random variable for the
index after which vM is one-ahead for vS ,
(a) Pr
[
vM 6≥ vS] ≤ p1−p ,
(b) Pr
[
vM 6≥ vS | 1 ∈M] ≤ ( p1−p)2, and
(c)
∑n
i=1 iPr
[
η = i | 1 ∈M] ≤ p
(1−2p)2 .
Furthermore, all inequalities are tight in the limit as n approaches ∞.
Lemma 5.3. The optimal envy-free revenue of a random sample S whose elements are selected
i.i.d. with probability p satisfies E
[
EFO(vS)
] ≥ pEFO(v).
Proof. Consider the envy-free optimal outcome for v. Clearly if we restrict attention only to the
agents in S there is still no envy. Therefore, EFO(vS) ≥ EFOS(v) where EFOS(v) is a short-hand
notation for the contribution from the agents in S to the envy-free optimal revenue on v. Of course,
E
[
EFOS(v)
]
= pEFO(v).
Definition 5.3 (BSPEp). The biased sampling profit extraction auction parameterized by p < 0.5
for a common budget B works as follows.
1. Partition the set of agents into vM and vS using biased sampling parameterized by p.
2. Run the clinching profit extractor parameterized by vS on vM and budget B.
Incentive compatibility of BSPEp comes straight from that of the profit extractor. We have the
following revenue guarantee.
Lemma 5.4. For all p < 0.5 the revenue of BSPEp satisfies,
BSPEp(v) ≥ (1− p)pEFO(v−1)− p(1−p)(1−2p)2 EFO(v2).
Proof. Condition on the case that the highest-valued agent, i.e., 1, is in M and let η is the index
after which vM is one-ahead for vS . From Lemma 5.1, the profit extractor’s revenue conditioned
on η = i is E
[
PEv
S
(vM ) | η = i] ≥ E[EFO(vS) | η = i] −∑ij=1E[EFOj(vS) | η = i]. This
inequality holds since we would extract the payment from all agents that are lower than i; or
equivalently, we would extract the full payment (the first term of the right-hand side) minus those
from the i highest agents (the second term). Using the observation that EFOj(v
S) ≤ EFO(v2) for
all j (because agent 1 is in M), we have:
E
[
PEv
S
(vM ) | η = i] ≥ E[EFO(vS) | η = i]− iEFO(v2).
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Summing these revenue guarantees over all η, we have:
BSPEp(v) =
∑∞
i=1
E
[
PEv
S
(vM ) | η = i]Pr[η = i]
≥
∑∞
i=1
E
[
EFO(vS) | η = i]Pr[η = i]
− EFO(v2)
∑∞
i=1
iPr
[
η = i
]
= E
[
EFO(vS)
]− EFO(v2) p(1−2p)2
≥ pEFO(v−1)− EFO(v2) p(1−2p)2 .
The last inequality comes from Lemma 5.3 on v−1. Finally, we remove the conditioning on 1 ∈M
by multiplying the above quantity by the probability 1− p.
Definition 5.4 (Pseudo-Vickery). The pseudo-Vickrey auction finds the feasible outcome x that
optimizes x1 with xj = 0 for j 6= 1 and runs the clinching auction with position weights x.
Hartline and Yan (2011) observe that EFO is subadditive (without budgets); it continues to be
subadditive with budgets (see Lemma C.1). Thus, EFO(v−1) + EFO(v2) ≥ EFO(2)(v).11 Further-
more, since pseudo-Vickery obtains at least EFO(v2), we have the following result.
Theorem 5.1. The convex combination of the pseudo-Vickery auction (with probability q1+q ) and
BSPEp (with probability
1
1+q ), where q = (1−p)p+ p(1−p)(1−2p)2 , approximates EFO(2)(v) within a factor
of 1 + 1(1−p)p +
1
(1−2p)2 . This ratio is minimized at 10.0 when p = 0.211.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Consider the following infinite random walk on a straight line: starting from
position 0, with probability p, move backward one step; otherwise, move forward one step. The
position of this random walk describes precisely the difference between the number of agents in
M and S, where positive value means M has more agents than S. We will show the results as
equalities by a “probability of ruin” analysis of an infinite random walk; inequalities follow for
random walks that terminate after a finite number n of steps.
1. The event vM 6≥ vS happens when there exists a time that M has fewer agents than S. Let r
be the probability of ruin, i.e., the random walk eventually takes one step backward from the
initial position, we have r = p + (1 − p)r2. The first component is the probability of taking
one step backward in the first step, and the second component is the probability of the first
step being a forward step, then eventually take two steps backward. Solving this equation for
r ∈ (0, 1) gives r = p/(1− p).
2. When we condition on 1 ∈ M , our initial position is 1, not 0, and the probability of ruin is
r2.
3. We will first derive Pr
[
η = i | 1 ∈M] for i ≥ 1. Since i is the lowest index after which vM is
one-ahead for vS , we must have (a) an equal partition amongst the top 2i agents, (b) v2i+1
is in M , and (c) from this point on, the number of agents assigned to M is never fewer than
11EFO(2)(v) = EFO(v(2)) where v(2) = (v2, v2, v3, . . . , vn).
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that from S. Thus, by conditioned on the highest value agent already in M , we have:
Pr
[
η = i | 1 ∈M]
=
(
2i−1
i
)
pi(1− p)i−1(1− p)(1− p1−p)
=
(2i
i
)[
p(1− p)]i 1−2p2(1−p) . (9)
The Taylor’s series expansion of 1√
1−4z for any 0 < z < 1/4 gives us
∞∑
i=0
(2i
i
)
zi = 1√
1−4z .
By differentiating both sides with respect to z, then multiplying them with z, we have
∞∑
i=1
i
(
2i
i
)
zi = 2z
(1−4z)√1−4z .
For z = p(1− p), we have √1− 4z = 1− 2p. Hence, this equality translates to
∞∑
i=1
i
(
2i
i
)[
p(1− p)]i = 2p(1−p)
(1−2p)3 . (10)
Putting these all together,
∞∑
i=1
iPr
[
η = i | 1 ∈M]
=
∞∑
i=1
i
(2i
i
)[
p(1− p)]i 1−2p2(1−p) from (9)
= 2p(1−p)
(1−2p)3
1−2p
2(1−p) from (10)
= p
(1−2p)2 .
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A Closed-form characterization of the clinching auction.
Here we give a detailed analysis of the clinching auction (Definition 4.1) in symmetric ordinal
(a.k.a. position) environments. Since position environments are symmetric and the budgets are
equal, agents who have not retired would clinch the same amount and have the same budget.
The feasibility constraints imposed by the position environment dictate that Xi =
∑i
j=1 xj ≤
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∑i
j=1wj = Wi, i.e., the cumulative allocation is at most the cumulative supply. Furthermore, at
any price-clock p and budget B, each agent that can afford p would desire at most B
p
units. Thus,
the budget constraint means that Xi ≤ iBp , i.e., the cumulative allocation is at most the cumulative
demand. These two constraints combine to restrict the cumulative allocation by the minimum of
the cumulative demand and supply, i.e., Xi ≤ Fi where Fi = min
(
Wi, i
B
p
)
; we refer to this as the
cumulative allocation constraint. The demand, supply, and cumulative allocation constraints are
all concave.
As agents simultaneously clinch some amount ∆ at price-clock p, the feasibility of the remaining
allocation and the budget would also change. More specifically, Wi would become W
′
i = Wi − i∆,
B would become B′ = B − p∆, and Fi would become F ′i = min
(
W ′i , i
B′
p
)
. The following lemma
describes the clinching behavior of the agents as the price-clock increases. Importantly, it shows
that (a) when i agents remain, only the cumulative supply, demand, and allocation constraints on
i− 1 and i are relevant; and (b) after clinching the allocation constraints on i− 1 and i are equal.
See Figure 3 for a depiction of the relevant constraints in the clinching process.
Lemma A.1. For a price clock p ∈ (vi+1, vi] and cumulative allocation constraints Fi−1 and Fi,
the amount that each agent can clinch is precisely ∆ = Fi − Fi−1, after which the newly induced
cumulative allocation constraints are equal, i.e., F ′i−1 = F
′
i , and the same (supply or demand)
constraint is binding at i− 1.
Proof. By definition of the clinching process, the amount that each agent can clinch is that re-
maining when all other agents have first taken as much as possible, this is exactly ∆ = Fi − Fi−1
when there are i active agents. With an initial budget constraint of B and price clock of p, the
budget and cumulative supply after clinching are B′ = B − p∆ and W ′i = Wi − i∆. Therefore the
cumulative allocation constraint is F ′i = min
(
W ′i , i
B′
p
)
= min
(
Wi − i∆, iBp − i∆
)
= Fi − i∆. Simi-
larly, F ′i−1 = Fi−1 − (i − 1)∆. From the definition of ∆, then, the resulting cumulative allocation
constraints are equal, i.e., F ′i−1 = F
′
i .
The clinching auction has two phases. In the first phase, the supply constraint is more restrictive
than the demand constraint on i − 1, i.e., Wi−1 < (i − 1)Bp . In the first phase, nothing happens
until either the price overtakes an agent’s value at which point the agent drops out and the number
of active agents decreases from i to i − 1 (and Lemma A.1 describes how supply is clinched at
such a point) or the condition defining the first phase stops holding and the second phase begins.
In the second phase, the two constraints are equal, i.e., Wi−1 = (i − 1)Bp . Therefore, the second
phase begins with p equal to (i− 1) B
Wi−1
and, as the price increases, the demand constraint binds
allowing agents to gradually clinch. The total amount clinched in this second phase is described in
the following lemma.
Lemma A.2. For cumulative supplies Wi−1 and Wi, budget B, and price clock p ∈ (vi+1, vi] such
that p = (i− 1) B
Wi−1
(i.e., the supply and demand constraints are equal at i− 1). As the price clock
increases to vi each of the top i agents clinch exactly
Wi
i
(
1− ( p
vi
)i)
; the total remaining supply is
Wi
(
p
vi
)i
.
Proof. Let G(p′) be the total allocation that the active i agents clinch while the price clock increases
from p to p′. We will see that G(·) is continuous and differentiable; therefore, the total payment for
this clinched amount is given by integrating the price times amount clinched at each price z ∈ [p, p′],
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Figure 3: For a price-clock p ∈ (vi+1, vi] the cumulative supply constraints (red dashed line) can be
represented by a concave curve with the vertical axis representing the cumulative allocation and
the horizontal axis representing the number of agents who can afford p. The budget B imposes
a sumulative demand constraint as given by a straight line with slope B
p
(blue dashed line). The
cumulative allocation constraint is the minimum of the cumulative supply and demand constraints
(thick purple line). Any concave non-decreasing curve that lies below the cumulative allocaton
constraint is a feasible cumulative allocation for the given supply and budget. After the agents
clinch some amount, the demand and supply constraints must be adjusted (thin purple line) to
take into account reduced budget and remnant supply.
i.e.,
∫ p′
p
zg(z) dz (where g(z) denotes the derivative of G(z) with respect to z). The new cumulative
supply and budget are:
W ′i =Wi − iG(p′)
B′ = B −
∫ p′
p
zg(z) dz.
By Lemma A.1, W ′i =W
′
i−1 = (i− 1)B
′
p′
. Therefore,
Wi − iG(p′) = (i− 1)
p′
(
B −
∫ p′
p
zg(z) dz
)
.
Multiplying both sides by p′, differentiating with respect to p′, and simplifying; we obtain the
differential equation,
Wi − iG(p′) = p′g(p′).
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It is easy to check that the following is the solution to this differential equation that satisfies the
initial condition G(p) = 0:
G(p′) = Wi
i
(
1− ( p
p′
)i)
.
Plugging in p′ = vi gives the desired result.
We are now ready to derive the closed-form characterization of the clinching auction in position
environments. Recall from Section 4 the definition of Bi = vi+1(w¯i − wi) +
∑n
j=i+1 vj(wj−1 − wj),
the minimum envy-free payment (ignoring the budget) when the top i agents are ironed (Figure 1),
and w¯i =Wi/i, the average weight of the top i positions.
Theorem 4.2. For any position environment given by position weights (w1, . . . , wn) and budget B
satisfying Bκ < B ≤ Bκ−1 for some κ, the polyhydral clinching auction would allocate with:
(a) wi to every i ≥ κ+ 1, and
(b) κw¯κ split among the top κ agents evenly except for agent κ obtaining δ less,
where δ is a simple function of vκ+1; vκ; the remaining budget, denoted B
′; and the unclinched
supply, denoted W ′κ, after agent κ+ 1 drops out.
Proof. We give an alternative derivation of κ in terms of the clinching process and then prove
that this definition satisfies the requirement of the theorem. As described by Lemma A.1, when
there are i agents remaining, the amount clinched depends on the cumulative allocation constraint
on i − 1 and i. This cumulative allocation constraint is the minimum of the supply and demand
constraints. Let κ + 1 be the highest valued agent for whom the demand constraint is strictly
non-binding throughout the clinching process. The process proceeds as follows.
1. The price clock ascends from 0 to vκ+1 and by the definition of κ the demand constraint
(from the budget) does not bind during this process. Lemma A.1 implies that clinching only
occurs as agents retire, i.e., at prices equal to the agents’ values. At each price-clock vi for
i ≥ κ+1, agent i drops out, while the top i−1 agents would clinch wi−1−wi with a payment
of vi(wi − wi−1).
After this phase the price clock is p′ = vκ+1, there are κ agents left, each agent i ≥ κ is
allocated wi, and each agent i ≤ κ is allocated wκ. The remaining budget for the top κ
agents and the cumulative supplies are:
B′ = B −
n∑
i=κ+1
vi(wi−1 − wi)
W ′κ =W
′
κ−1 = (κ− 1)(w¯κ−1 − wκ).
2. With κ agents still active, the cumulative allocation constraint on κ−1 agents is the minimum
of cumulative supply W ′κ−1 and the cumulative demand (κ − 1) B
′
vκ+1
. There are two cases
depending on which is binding.
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(a) If the demand constraint (from the budget) is not yet binding then the price clock
will continue to ascend from vκ+1 to p
′′ = (κ− 1) B′
W ′
κ−1
when the demand constraint first
(weakly) binds. This must happen at p′′ ≤ vκ by the definition of κ. No additional supply
is clinched and W ′′ = W ′ and B′′ = B′. At this point the conditions of Lemma A.2 are
satisfied.
(b) If the demand constraint is (strictly) binding then, at the same price clock p′′ = p′ =
vκ+1, additional supply is clinched. Lemma A.1 says that each of the top κ agents clinch
an additional W ′κ − (κ− 1) B
′
vκ+1
. The new budget and cumulative constraints are:
B′′ = κB′ −W ′κvκ+1,
W ′′κ =W
′′
κ−1 = (κ− 1)(κB′/vκ+1 −W ′κ).
At this point the conditions of Lemma A.2 are satisfied.
3. As the conditions of Lemma A.2 are met, the price clock now ascends from p′′ to vκ and
an amount of W
′′
κ
κ
(
1 − (p′′
vκ
)κ)
is clinched by the top κ agents. The remaining supply (by
Lemma A.2) is
W ′′′κ =W
′′′
κ−1 =W
′′
κ
(
p′′
vκ
)κ
.
4. Agent κ retires as the price clock exceeds vκ. As the linear demand constraint was binding
at κ − 1 in Step 3, only it remains. Each of the κ − 1 active agents clinch an amount equal
to the slope of this constraint and thereby equally split the entire remaining supply of W ′′′κ−1.
The amount clinched is
δ =
W ′′′
κ−1
κ−1 =
W ′′κ
κ−1
(
p′′
vκ
)κ
where plugging in the appropriate p′′ and W ′′κ gives the formula for δ in terms of vκ+1, vκ,
B′, and W ′κ as desired by the theorem.
Finally, we argue that κ satisfies the definition from the theorem statement, i.e., Bκ < B ≤
Bκ−1. This follows easily from inspection of Figure 1.
B Revenue approximation without budgets
In this section we give a variant of the biased sampling profit extraction auction for bidders without
budgets. We are able to obtain a better approximation ratio of 7.5 (versus 10.0) when we use the
profit extractor from Ha and Hartline (2012) that is incompatible with budgets. To get such an
improvement, we employed three techniques that cannot be utilized when agents are budgeted,
namely:
• Always keep the highest value agent in the market.
• Reject (almost) everyone if there is no point-wise dominance.
• Always serve the highest agent, even when everyone else is rejected.
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These will become clear in the definition of our mechanism. First, here is the profit extractor
that was introduced by Ha and Hartline (2012).
Definition B.1 (PERv˜). The profit extractor with rejection parameterized by a non-increasing
valuation vector v˜ whose optimal envy-free allocation is x˜, PERv˜, would:
1. Sort the bids in a non-increasing order. If v˜i > vi for some i, reject everyone and charge
nothing.
2. Serve agent i with probability x˜i and charge the appropriate IC payment.
Lemma B.1 (Ha and Hartline, 2012). For any v ≥ v˜, the revenue of the Profit Extractor with
Rejection for v˜ on v is at least the envy-free optimal revenue for v˜. Moreover, the inequality holds
for each agent: PERv˜j (v) ≥ EFOj(v˜).
This profit extractor can be used with a variant of the biased sampling profit extraction mech-
anism that guarantees, in an incentive compatible way, that the highest valued agent is in the
market. This conditioning improves the probability that the market and sample satisfy the domi-
nance property necessary for the profit extractor to succeed.
Definition B.2 (BSPEp). The biased sampling profit extraction auction parameterized by p < 0.5
works as follow.
1. Pad the bids with a decreasing list of infinitely many number of infinitesimally small positive
values, e.g., vi = ǫ
i, for i > n.
2. Randomly assign each of the agents to one of three groups A, B, and C independently with
probabilities p, p, and 1− 2p, respectively.
3. Assume without loss of generality that of the highest valued agent in A has value at least that
of the highest valued agent in B. Define the market M = A ∪ C and sample S = B. (If this
highest valued agent in A wins in Step 4 and the second highest valued agent in A ∪ B is in
B, increase her payment to this second highest value.)
4. Run the profit extractor with rejection for vS on vM , where vS and vM are valuation vectors
of S and M respectively.
5. If all agents are rejected by the profit extractor and it is feasible to serve agent 1 (the highest
valued agent over all), serve her and charge her v2.
Lemma B.2 (Incentive Compatibility). For all probabilities p < 0.5, BSPEp is incentive compati-
ble.
Proof. Fix the partitioning of A, B, and C. No agent in M can change the definition of sets M
and S without losing (thus obtaining zero utility). No agent in S can change the definition of sets
M and S without obtaining a payment of at least her value (from the parenthetical in Step 3, thus
obtaining non-positive utility). Therefore no agent wants to manipulate the definition of M and S.
For givenM and S, this mechanism is the profit extraction mechanism which is incentive compatible
for fixed M and S. Only the highest valued agent would want to win in Step 5; furthermore, she
cannot cause dominance to fail without lowering her bid (and forfeiting her status as the highest
bidder).
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Theorem B.1. For any downward-closed permutation environment and any probability p < 0.5,12
BSPEp approximates EFO
(2)(v) within factor of min
{
p−( p1−p)2, ( p1−p)2}.13 This ratio is optimized
at p = 0.268 which gives a 7.5 approximation.
Proof. Lemma B.1 says that we would obtain at least EFO(vS) when vM ≥ vS , while Step 5 of
the mechanism guarantees EFO(v2) otherwise. Furthermore, Step 1 ensures the equality in part
(b) of Lemma 5.2. Thus, the expected revenue is at least:
E
[
BSPEp(v)
] ≥ E[EFO(vS) | vM ≥ vS] ·Pr[vM ≥ vS]
+ EFO(v2) ·Pr
[
vM 6≥ vS]
= E
[
EFO(vS)
]−E[EFO(vS) | vM 6≥ vS] ·Pr[vM 6≥ vS]
+ EFO(v2) ·Pr
[
vM 6≥ vS]
≥ pEFO(v−1)− EFO(v−1) ·Pr
[
vM 6≥ vS]
+ EFO(v2) ·Pr
[
vM 6≥ vS]
=
[
p− ( p1−p)2] · EFO(v−1) + ( p1−p)2 · EFO(v2)
≥ min{p− ( p1−p)2, ( p1−p)2}EFO(2)(v).
The second inequality warrants some explanation: the first term follows from applying Lemma 5.3
to v−1 = (v2, v3, . . .), the second term follows from monotonicity of EFO. The last inequality follows
from the subadditivity of EFO (see Lemma C.1, below) which implies that EFO(v−1)+EFO(v2) ≥
EFO(2)(v).
C Missing Proofs
Hartline and Yan (2011) gave the following proof that envy-free revenue is subaditive; the proof is
unaffected by the agents’ budget.
Lemma C.1. The envy-free optimal revenue for agents with a common budget is a subadditive
function.
Proof. Consider a partition of the original set of agents N into S and M . One way to obtain an
envy-free outcome for S (resp. M) is to calculate an envy-free outcome for the full set of agents N ,
and then ignore the agents not in S (resp. M). The optimal envy-free outcome for S (resp. M) is
certainly no wose. Therefore, the combined optimal envy-free revenue for S and M individually is
at least that of the full set N .
12The first part of this lemma is non-trivial only for p < 0.38.
13EFO(2)(v) = EFO(v(2)) where v(2) = (v2, v2, v3, . . . , vn).
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